Degrowth and Politics: Searching for a Shared Imaginary⁽¹⁾

Autore: Mauro Bonaiuti⁽²⁾ Univ. of Bologna, Italian Degrowth Network

Sommario:Traduzione in inglese dell'articolo di Mauro Bonaiuti "DECRESCITA E POLITICA - Per una società autonoma, equa e sostenibile"

Abstract
The post-modern condition is characterized by the end of the metanarratives (grand narratives, Lyotard, 1979), by the emergence of a liquid social organization and fragmented, fluid imaginary.
Since social systems, unlike physical and biological ones, are characterized by the capability to negotiate meanings (Lane), they react according to what may be defined shared imaginary.
The absence, or the extreme fragmentation, of such shared representations of the world, makes any attempt to institute “alternative” social organizations ineffectual.
Following a functional division (economic, ecological, social and cultural) the paper attempts to identify a few “fundamental” processes, in which growth is the common denominator, and which explain the reasons for the multidimensional crisis we are facing.
The analysis starts from the growth process which characterized industrial capitalism first and financial capitalism later, pointing out its self-pursuing character and the main consequences for the ecological equilibrium. The effects of growth on inequality (S. Latouche, 1991; S. Amin, 2002),
on the progressive dissolution of social relationships (K. Polanyi, 1944, Bauman, 2005, 2007) and on the liquidity of collective imaginary (Castoriadis, 2005) are examined, with a view to offering a systemic interpretation of these processes.
What emerges from this analysis are four dimensions through which an interpretation of contemporary crisis is possible. Starting from these dimensions a framework of a political programme toward a degrowth society may be delineated. Examples are provided of policies
capable of triggering self-reinforcing relationships among degrowth, sustainability and autonomy.

Introduction

A new spectre is haunting Europe, the spectre of degrowth. Faced with a widespread ecological, social and political crisis, with injustice, with a loss of meaning, insecurity and finally the possibility of the collapse of the very economic system itself, not only political movements but also growing sectors of the public are wondering what new plan might be conceived for society.
It is a very delicate question. Serge Latouche himself, when requested to take up a standpoint, frequently made it immediately clear that degrowth is above all a slogan, and that there are no “ready-made political solutions”. Indeed, overcoming today’s model and changing to a true, just, calm, sustainable and autonomous society of degrowth raises such vast, complex problems that one must be wary of anyone who proposes simplistic solutions. On the other hand, the crisis is so pressing that it is not possible to be deaf to these questions, nor can the time for defining a plan of action be any longer deferred. Moreover, there has been considerable progress in theoretical
considerations in recent years and it cannot now be claimed that degrowth merely represents a criticism of neo-classical economy: some proposals for political action can accompany the pars destruens (Latouche, 2007).
It is obvious that, of the hundreds of liquid voices characterising post-modernity, “degrowth” means a shared, meaningful horizon, a systemic vision of the whole, which gathers and links within itself some of the examples of progress advanced in recent years by political movements. It is this task of weaving, of proposing a shared import, that must be carried forward forcefully and without delay. Opinion that the system is facing a grave crisis has now become very common. However, the perception of the urgency of this crisis, and to an even greater degree the strategies by means of which it may be tackled, differ vastly. The possibility of embracing the various dimensions of the
crisis within one single viewpoint, and above all the possibility of seeing behind the extraordinary changeability of its manifestations, the operating of a systemic dynamics that is undoubtedly complex, but which can be deciphered and imputed to the working of a few basic processes, represents the true “challenge” of that horizon of thought which we call degrowth.

The spiral of growth and accumulation

The fundamental trait of any capitalist economy is the fact that part of the profit made by enterprises is reinvested, thus contributing to an increase in capital, which then, by means of technological innovation, becomes the basis for creating more profit. This process explains the uncontrollable economic growth that has characterised these types of economy since the Industrial Revolution; it is a process, however, that was unknown to all the earlier forms of economic and social organisation. Although the process is more complex than we can describe here, it can hardly be denied that the nature of capitalism is self-expanding.
Yet, while innumerable words have been spent on celebrating the self-regulating character of markets, very little is said that underlines the self-expanding nature of the process of accumulation.
It had already reached its full maturity at the beginning of the twentieth century, when the American economy assumed the form of “monopolistic capitalism”, well described by Baran and Sweezy (1968). The process of the accumulation of capital, being a self-increasing process, has the ability to lead the system towards the concentration of enterprises into a few large bodies. It has today reached its purest form in the processes of financial concentration, wherein the concentration of
property and control typically corresponds to productive decentralisation, by means of multinational enterprise.
Classic economists, Marx in particular, already understood quite well that this circular, recursive process was the fundamental trait of the capitalist economic system. A systemic approach, however, enables us, as we shall see, to reinterpret these processes in a new, less ideological, way.
However well a systemic analysis may point out a multiplicity of self-developing spirals of this type, the process of the growth and accumulation of capital assumes, in my view, a central role in the dynamics of the world system for two reasons: first, for its undeniable force and pervasiveness and, secondly, as we shall see, because the other significant, self-destructive processes – from the spiral of the ecological crisis to that of poverty/exclusion – are a consequence of the former. We
shall restrict ourselves here to pointing out some of these basic processes.

The spiral of growth and the ecological crisis

What, to be very succinct, is the reason for the crisis between the self-increasing nature of the capitalist system and the biosphere? As is known, in standard economic conceptions (including the Marxist one) growth is in any case generally assumed to be positive. This is perhaps why neoclassical economists have never considered that it should be subjected to any restrictions: in their view, more always means better. Without going into the anthropological limitations to this concept, it is clear that it was created in an historical phase of the capitalist process when the stocks of the biosphere were so readily available that the services they offered (resources, absorption of
waste, etc.) seemed virtually inexhaustible. Moreover, there was also a concept of science founded on the separation among different types of knowledge; thus economics was considered to be an isolated system. However, it is not so: from the fundamental bioeconomic studies of Georgescu-Roegen (1971, 1976) we have learnt how the economic process is rooted in the biophysical system that maintains it and it is, thus, subject to the limitations of a biological and thermodynamic nature.
The consequence can be summed up in the following conclusion: the basic objective of economic process, unrestricted growth of production and income, contradicts the fundamental laws of thermodynamics. It must, therefore, be rejected, or somehow radically reconsidered.
Another important conclusion can be drawn from the above: as biologists are well aware, the type of trend that characterises self-increasing processes in a limited environment is that described by the logistic curve, with its characteristic bell-shape: first there is a rapid growth and then, when the peak is reached, a falling trend.
The best-known, but by no means the only, work that uses a systemic approach, thereby revealing trends of this type, is the classic study by the MIT, Limits to growth. (Meadows D. e D. Randes J., 2004). What we should like to underline here is not so much a forecast of the dates of the peaks of the different variables but rather the type of trend we may expect for the basic variables in the system (population, life expectancy, industrial production, etc.). Unless some “Promethean”
technology is found, the system will present the classic bell-shaped trend: first rising, then falling.
We may add that the temporal scale of the peak of the main variables, according to researchers at the MIT, while we are aware that there can be no certainties about this, lies somewhere between ten and twenty years, which is to say very soon, if one considers the “inertia” (or more correctly
feedback delays) that characterises anthropo-economic systems.
A fully systemic approach cannot, however, be restricted to considering merely variables of an economic and ecological nature, as is the case of the MIT study: it will also have to introduce considerations of a social and symbolic type. The present state of research permits us to state that a fully systemic approach foresees at least four dimensions: economic, ecological, social and cultural.

The Growth-Poverty spiral

On closer inspection, the whole history of modern times may be interpreted as the history of great expansion: military, geographical, technical-scientific and, first and foremost, economic. It is indeed the history of development, and of its backbone, economic growth. In the years following the Second World War this history reached its peak. These were the years of the economic boom, mass production and the Keynesian pact between capital and labour.
At the international level from President Truman's famous State of the Union Address in 1949 development became the key word in defining the west's relations with the rest of the world (it is not accidental that these countries have since been referred to as “developing countries”. In this way the hegemonic policy of the west becomes disguised as a monumental plan of universal emancipation: the whole planet is invited to follow the west in its magnificent and progressive destiny of growth and development.
Needless to say, the improvements in the material conditions of life that took place in this period, particularly in the years from 1955 to 1975, cannot be denied, at least in the western world.
However, from the 1980s it has become increasingly evident that the recipe for development could not be extended to everyone, despite the universalist claims of the West.
The data we have at our disposal in this regard speak for themselves: the Gross National Product (GNP) of the entire African continent is today still less than 2% of global GNP. It is now obvious that Africa, and many countries in Asia, have remained far behind.
Generally speaking, on a worldwide level the gap in income between the very rich and the extremely poor is dramatically becoming wider and wider. One datum will suffice to exemplify this: the annual income of the richest 1% of the people on Earth is more than the annual income of 57% of the world’s poorest population (3 billion, 500 million people).3 The scene worldwide is increasingly that in which wealth and well-being exist alongside a vast panorama of those excluded from the feast of consumer society. Whatever the figures used to dramatise this reality (2 billion, 737 million people who live on less than 2 dollars a day, or a baby dying every three seconds), they testify to the fact that not only has the grand programme of development not been able to eliminate the plague of poverty, but has also meant that the fate of the very wealthy and that of the poor are dramatically becoming more and more distant. Within the rich countries, there are various ways in which people are being marginalised and are having to face hardship, thereby joining the ranks of those who are already radically excluded. There are over 100 million “newly impoverished” people in Europe and the United States.
What is the reason, then, why the great engine of development, the great western dream of offering ever-improving living conditions to the whole of humanity has come to grief?
Although this picture is undoubtedly complex, influenced as it is by the diverse historical and political conditions of each country, I believe the workings of an underlying systemic dynamic may be detected beneath the surface of diversity: as seen above, the process of growth and accumulation has a self-increasing nature. The ever-increasing number of investments of western countries from the dawn of industrialization has generated more and more rapid technological progress which has brought about both increases in productivity and continual innovations. The growing profits thus gained are re-invested, resulting in further increases in productivity and continual product innovations. Given the competitive nature of international markets, it follows that those who have not succeeded in keeping pace with innovations and technological progress find themselves facing a technological gap increasingly difficult to bridge.
It is now clear that technological progress, and thus productivity, has reached such levels that a minority is capable of producing all that the world economies require. The others, those “shipwrecked by development” (both as individuals and as entire nations), are unable to take part in this game and are left with the crumbs falling from the table of global consumerism.
It cannot be denied that, alongside this self-reinforcing dynamic, there are also processes of a self-correcting nature, such as the so-called 'trickle down effect'. This effect can explain how wealth and material well-being spread starting from the richer countries to areas and countries generally located in proximity to more developed ones. These areas, which generally possess an intermediate technological level, will thus benefit from the greater investments and growth rates of the “center”. The “trickle-down effect”, however, does not bring into question the self-increasing nature of the growth process as such, which indeed constitutes the primary process owing to its history and scope. If this underlying dynamic has characterized the parabola of development up to now, then it comes as no surprise that we are confronted with a polarized world economy where the contrast between the center and the periphery is becoming more and more marked (S. Amin 2002, Latouche 1991), and where growth is exacerbating the drama of poverty and exclusion, instead of resolving it.
The more the self-reinforcing dynamic is free from any self-regulating intervention, the greater the polarization will be. As we know, this is the policy that has been endorsed by international organizations (WTO, IMF, etc.) over the past 25 years of uncontrolled globalization. If the failure to find a solution to poverty, and the co-existence of wealth and poverty are the most evident manifestations of the social crisis of our times, we need to shift our attention in order to seek a common interpretative matrix capable of explaining the discontent and malaise within the richer nations.

The growth spiral and the dissolution of social ties

For Karl Polanyi the capitalistic process, the great transformation, which accompanied the industrial revolution, implies a dual process of mercantilization: factors of production, human beings and nature must be reduced to commodities. It is the megamachine that demands it: the regular supply of work and natural resources is in fact an inescapable necessity for the productive process to be carried out regularly and above all, for huge invested capital to find adeguate and relatively safe returns. Thus, between the XVIII-XIX centuries, the conditions are created for the foundation of a labour market. This process resembles a social metamorphosis more than a process of natural and continual development, as Polanyi himself strongly underlined: the relations of reciprocity on which the traditional socio-economic systems were founded are broken, often
violently, and replaced by market relations. To use the words of the great economist, the economy advances on the desertification of society.
As has been shown by the pioneering work of Marcell Mauss and by the studies of the Movement Anti-Utilitariste Dans Les Sciences Socielles which he inspired, (in particular by A. Caillè, J.T. Godbout, S. Latouche), what characterizes traditional societies is the three-fold obligation of giving, receiving and reciprocating /returning (A. Caillè, 1991). In other words, it is through the multiplication of giving and taking that social ties are maintained and strengthened. In contrast, what characterizes market relations is their impersonal nature, based on so-called equivalent exchange?. This allows market relations to end once the exchange has occurred. As soon as we leave the checkout counter of a supermarket we can completely disregard not only the relation with the cashier or the owner, but also how the products we have purchased were produced: if child labour was employed or if polluting processes or products were used, etc. As Milton Friedman ,father of the neo-liberal school of Chicago, stated, “in the great global supermarket you don't need to know or like one another”. All this has certainly allowed an extraordinary growth of the number and variety of goods: in the city of New York alone 100 billion different kinds of goods are available today. What is normally left unsaid is that this coin has another side: the extension of market relations is in fact accompanied by the progressive dissolution of social ties.
In the first phase of the industrial revolution the process of mercantilization gave rise to a deep rupture in social ties, whereas in contemporary western society it manifests itself as social liquidity. According to Bauman (2005, 2007), the modern liquid society is a consumer society in which everything, both goods and individuals, are treated as objects of consumption. As a result, they lose any utility, appeal, in a word, value while being used. The liquid society is a mobile, impermanent precarious society in which all that has value is rapidly transformed into its opposite, including relationships and human beings. The liquid society, therefore, is a risk society in which
the freedom to seek one's identity through consuming (individualization?) is paid for by growing insecurity.
In conclusion, it is important to point out that the dissolution of social ties characteristic of modern liquid societies, just like the processes of mercantilization in the early stages of the industrial revolution, are the consequence of the same self-increasing process: the spiral of growth and the extension of the market economy. Moreover, the economic system has the capacity to feed on the problems it generates: insecurity, malaise and numerous other by-products of the dissolution of social ties sustain a growing demand for protection and care, resulting in a wide-ranging supply of ad hoc goods and services, reinforcing economic growth.

The four dimensions of a degrowth policy

Once this unavoidable premises has been made, what may the basic characteristics of a degrowth policy be?
I suggest the following general criterion: any policy that compensates - by means of suitable negative links of feedback - for the current self-increasing processes makes a move in the right direction. By following this briefly outlined analytical approach, it is possible to determine four basic dimensions for the evaluation of a degrowth policy: economic, ecological, social and cultural/symbolic. Any political programme to be hoped for must therefore move:

· From growth to degrowth
· From unsustainability to sustainability
· From inequality (competitiveness) to fairness (cooperation/reciprocity)
· From dependency to autonomy

Although this representation is highly abstract, it does point out some aspects that are fundamental for us. First: however the dimension of equality, that is to say together with Bobbio (1994) that signified by a traditional Left-Right political polarity, may still be a relevant contemporary question; indeed, it cannot be ignored if one wishes to define the area in which history is to be interpreted. Yet it is no longer enaught: at least one other dimension must be added to it: that of sustainability/unsustainability.
However, if we wish to understand fully the struggles and revendications of the political groups which, at least from the origins of the Socialist movement, up to today’s environmentalist or feminist groups, and the various examples of all those who in various corners of the world are fighting for the defence and shared management of resources and common goods, then we must add to the first two at least a third dimension, which we define, along with Castoriadis, autonomy.
Briefly, by autonomy we mean “the project of a society in which all citizens have an equal, effective chance to participate in the society’s legislation, government, jurisdiction and, finally, institution” (Castoriadis, 2005).
If we imagine a matrix formed by these three axes, the first obvious conclusion is that western societies all fall in the top right-hand corner of the matrix. The scheme thus offers us an initial, simple criterion of evaluation: any policy capable of re-equilibrating the position of a society by moving it “towards the bottom left-hand corner” of the matrix is moving in the direction we hope for.

The second aspect: just as it is not difficult to demonstrate, for western countries, the existence of a vicious circle among growth, competitiveness and dependency, so is it important to note the existence of a virtuous circle among degrowth, sustainability and autonomy. Let us try to understand this important process better. First of all, a degrowth society, a society, that is, that has reduced the weight and scale of its own megastructures, would favour the attainment of an effective
ecological sustainability. The closure of bioeconomic circles is only possible on a regional or local level, where information is available and where better control concerning the sustainability of productive processes is possible. It is true that smaller does not necessarily mean more efficient from an ecological point of view, but small to medium-sized productive structures are the only ones that permit a certain shared control of technology and are thus the only ones that in actual fact are capable of making choices in favour of a true ecological sustainability. To the same degree, degrowth is a condition for social equality. As has been shown (S. Latouche, 2003; G. Rist, 1998) inequality and exclusion are, above all, the offspring of growth. In the end, only an economy that has reduced the scale of its apparatuses can give rise to an autonomous society (Castoriadis, 1998, 2005). In other words, only technology that has renounced its own giant dimensions, its desire for power, can be managed in a shared fashion, on a local level, collectively, thus giving birth to an autonomous, convivial society. On the other hand, only a society that has been able to transform its own imaginary, encouraging autonomy, will be capable of generating individuals and institutions that may accompany the transformation of economic structures, in other words achieve degrowth. In this virtuous circle it is obvious that there is little point in asking whether the imaginary or the socio-economic structures should be changed first, since the one goes hand in hand with, and supports, the transformation of the others, and vice versa. What types of processes may favour this re-equilibration? And what concrete proposals can we put forward? If the analysis we have given is correct, if, that is to say, the capitalist system is characterised principally as a self-increasing system, and if it is responsible for social inequalities and the devastation of the biosphere, imagining a degrowth policy means above all individuating some feedback processes capable of allowing the system first of all to avoid its collapse and, afterwards, starting a process of socio-economic and cultural transformation on the road towards sustainability, justice and autonomy. One might also ask, polemically, the opposite question: If the capitalist system is, as we have maintained, a self-increasing system, how is it possible that it has not yet given rise to its own selfdestruction? It is undoubtedly true that there are many symptoms of a crisis and that every growth process requires an uncertain period of time before it destroys the system s capacity to react (resilience). However, there is no doubt that if, even after over two centuries, the capitalist system has not yet collapsed, although this has been predicted several times, it is due to the simultaneous operation of determinant processes of a self-correcting nature. 

I shall start by illustrating a few classic cases in the twentieth-century economic-political tradition, but which have not yet been interpreted in a systemic key. Probably the most significant case is that pertaining to the traditional welfare policies of Keynesian origin. Seen from a systemic point of view, traditional policies of redistribution, which use, for example, the well-known institutions of progressive taxation, represent a typical example of negative feedback. Keynesian policies, taken as a whole, probably represented the most significant compensatory process that the twentieth century was able to offer to the lack of social equilibrium caused by capitalist accumulation. In the same way, we can interpret the trade-unions struggles and pressures to sustain salaries and working conditions. It is following the very periods of crisis, such as after the Great Depression, that the system brought about the most significant processes of a compensatory nature, giving rise to the social state and to the various forms of safeguarding labour. Yet it must be clearly said that traditional Keynesian policies, while contributing to the salvation of the economic system from the crises of the twentieth century, will not be able to provide a suitable answer to the crises in the twenty-first century for the simple reason that Keynesian policies, acting as a multiplier of consumption and hence of growth, cannot but aggravate the current ecological crisis. Of course, standard economists, both of neoclassical and of Keynesian school, will object that thanks to technological progress it will be possible to increase aggregate production while reducing the impact on ecosystems (ecoefficiency). This is, however, as I have shown elsewhere (2005), a course that camouflages some systemic traps: in reality, technological progress actually accompanies an increase in the total consumption of matter/energy and in the impact on the biosphere; this is clearly shown by the data at our disposal (rebound effect). If one wishes to find a solution to the present ecological crisis, and imagine a new type of sustainable, serene society, possibly capable of affording subjects a high level of autonomy and self-determination, one cannot exclude a decisive inversion in today s dynamic trend towards a global economic system, that is to say it cannot progress but by degrowth policies. In the following part of this paper, I shall try to offer some political proposals in principle, articulated according to the four dimensions (growth, sustainability, fairness, autonomy), which are indicated in the first part. The following proposals move from the widest scale, the global one, towards the national and local dimension. As we shall see, the question of scale is for several reasons fundamental. In the first place, an increase in size, for example the continual growth of productive apparatuses, beyond a certain threshold, causes the emergence of new phenomena. These  emerging properties generally involve alterations in systemic equilibria, such as the disruption of social ties or ecological crises. In the second place, processes of participation are also tied to scale: in general, the more the dimensions of the political-administrative units increase, the more the possibility of democratic participation is reduced. It is furthermore clear that the more an economic system has become autonomous from the social sphere (Polanyi, 1944), and the scale on which it operates is super-ordinated to that on which political participation takes place, the more the economy will end up by moving outside any democratic control. This is precisely the situation today, as has frequently been denounced (Latouche, 1991, 2006). The need to reduce the scale of the great financial, technical and bureaucratic apparatuses derives from this. The very ideology of orthodox political and economic thought, according to which the market itself will define the  optimum scale on which the various economic-productive processes are carried out, is, as we have seen, totally misleading. It is true that the market is capable of selfregulating processes, but only in a short period in response to signals that come from variations in prices. As we know, this is not the case for the major upheavals of an ecological and social nature. In the long term, the market supports a self-increasing dynamics. On the level of the financial and productive system, this all means a predominance of giantism, of the fusion among colossi: it is a logic according to which  bigger is always better , at least until it has a corresponding reduction in average costs (economy of scale). This sort of  bigger is better ideology has produced such a loss of knowledge about matters connected to scale that a true task of re-education has become necessary. For example, it is true that every technological process implies a certain scale of production (e.g. you can make your own yoghurt at home but not your computer).

In general, we must admit that a higher level of complexity and variety in the offer of goods and services requires wider scales, but nearly all primary economic processes (such as food production) and most of the production of secondary goods and of energy would be possible on a regional/local scale. This process of decentralisation would make it possible to create ecologically and socially  sustainable agricultural, energy and productive systems in the various territories. On the other hand, participation rapidly decreases along with the rise in the scale on which decisions are made. Here, too, it must be acknowledged that participation involves increasing costs (in terms of time and resources) along with the growth of the scale and the complexity of processes; therefore, while it is possible to make certain decisions on certain scales, this is not possible on others.

Thus, there is a trade-off between complexity and variety in the offer of goods and services, on the one hand, and a shared control of technology, on the other. In general, a greater variety of offer (and lower costs) implies less democratic control. The reader must have noticed the predominantly political nature of this type of dilemma. The idea proposed here, therefore, moves in the direction of bringing the baricentre of the economic process on the scale closer to that on which effective political participation is expressed. By reducing the scale of the former and increasing the latter it is possible to imagine a sort of convergence towards a society capable of making responsible decisions about  how and  what is to be produced in a certain territory. This would leave enterprises a certain freedom of movement, within a precise framework, shared democratically, protecting the inescapable principles of ecological and social sustainability: this is what I imagine when I speak of an autonomous, convivial society of degrowth. To put it in other words, a reduction in the scale of the large apparatuses, necessary to reduce inequality and to carry out forms of production that are ecologically sustainable, offers a an extraordinary chance of democracy, a chance, perhaps for the first time in history, of linking  decent states of material well-being and forms of shared, autonomous political organisation in which communities become the creators of their own destiny. Let us see, then, by means of which concrete political measures it would be possible to take steps in this direction. 


1. From growth to degrowth

Degrowth, as far as economics are concerned, means above all, reducing the importance and size of large financial and productive structures, and, more generally, of large organisations systems of media, transport, health, education, etc.). A degrowth policy could therefore take steps
towards:

· Restricting the movements and concentrations of capital
· Reforming international institutions (UNO, WTO, IMF)

Introducing restrictions to the movements of capital, for example by means of the introduction of a tax on financial operations of a speculative nature, represents a measure that is not only to be hoped for from an ethical point of view but is also capable of providing greater stability to the whole global economic system, which faces dangerous oscillations as a result of speculation. If we add to these reasons, which are in themselves sufficient to justify introducing them, the fact that the funds thereby collected could be used to eliminate the hunger and poverty in the poorest countries, we can deduce the remarkable potentiality of this instrument. The introduction of a tax percentage along the lines of the  Tobin Tax , for which a law has recently been proposed in Europe, undoubtedly makes a move in the direction we hope for here, as long as the funds collected are really destined for radical measures against the shame of famine and exclusion and not for generic  development policies that would end up only by deteriorating the situation in the  least advantaged countries . If one thinks that even 0,1% would involve a sum which, in the lowest estimate, would be of about 30 billion dollars in the EU alone (Brancaccio, 2002)  a sum greater than that which the Union reserves for depressed areas  it is clear that the Tobin Tax, if applied correctly, could become a world campaign of a great symbolic impact, thus constituting a first step towards a reform of international financial regimes.

The principle of reducing the scale pointed out above for financial economy would also be applied to the productive economy, starting, for example, with a more rigorous application of antitrust norms. More generally, the introduction of progressive tax rates on large properties and incomes (both of firms and of individuals) would in practice lead to a disincentive to the concentration of enterprises and overcome the form of the multinational company. It is obvious that the introduction of such restrictions requires a preventive radical reform of international financial institutions and of government monetary policies, with the aim not only of providing a democratic control over these institutions (now basically governed by the interests of private capital) but also of complementing the mechanisms of the international financial system with instruments of fiscal and monetary poilicy in the hands of local institutions. The result would be a gradual decentralisation of a significant part of economic activities from the global to the regional or local level, which would make it possible to lay the foundations of the  valorization of territories , that is to say of the individual and collective wealth (common wealth) that many hope for.


2. From unsustainability to sustainability

Shifting the centre of gravity from a global to a prevalently regional or local scale is also the most efficient way of seeking a solution to the ecological problem. True sustainability can only be contemplated on a local level. This is not only because transportation of goods would be reduced but also because it is only at a local level that the information permitting first the attainment, and later the control, of the effective sustainability of productive processes is available. The aim of soustainability is, therefore, widely a concequence of degrowth. This does not, of course, exonerate us from proposing ad hoc environmental policies in order to set the system along the path towards ecological sustainability, in particular:

· Launching a European programme of the conversion of the energy system accordingto sustainability criteria by means of:
· A rigorous application of the principle that “He who pollutes must pay”.

Reconverting the productive energy system towards sustainability requires the convergence of two processes: a reduction in comsumption (sufficiency) and an improvement in efficiency in the use of energy (eco-efficiency) (Sachs, 2002). Yet, however indispensable these two processes are, they are not enough in themselves to ensure sustainability: a true technological revolution is required, starting with energy. As far as the latter point is concerned, the project suggested by Jeremy Rifkin (2002) has the advantage of seeing the great importance of the challenge implicit in the  "energy revolution". His proposal is based on a combination of three factors: 1) renewable sources of energy, 2) intelligent systems of management of the distribution network, which would make it possible for citizens and enterprises to be promoted from being mere consumers to becoming small energy producers, and 3) hydrogen for conserving energy; this proposal would involve a truly radical technological revolution leading towards sustainability. The fundamental point, which is not always clear in Rifkin s proposal, is that it is necessary to ensure that the systems of management of the distribution network, and more generally the technology employed in process of reconversion/production, do not fall into the hands of multinationals, but remain firmly under the control of citizens and territories, if this technological revolution is to uphold a social transformation towards autonomy.

The answer to the question, therefore, of how to obtain the resources in order to activate the process of reconversion, if we do not want to leave them in the hands of large private capital, still has to be found. I think that the answer may lie in applying the principle of "He who pollutes must pay".

As is known, the application of this principle foresees various forms of payment (e.g. taxes) for anyone who damages the ecosystem (negative externality). One way of making these tools more attractive, thus more acceptable to the general public, would be that of directly transferring the income percentages from ecological taxes (eg. Carbon Tax) to those who create ecologically virtuous actions (to the state that does not destroy forests, the region that decides to convert its energy system, the individual citizen who uses a bicycle instead of a car), who could then become the direct beneficiaries of incentives. Public administration would have the task of defining the tools and ensuring the correctness of the process. I should like to point out that these instruments are fully entitled to be included in the tool-box of standard economics. The reason why an extremely limited use of them has been made so far is due to the fact that these measures, when compared to criteria of true sustainability, would certainly be effective and would thus force enterprises (and consumers) to reconsider to a significant extent their own productive systems and life-styles. The energy system would be forced to be converted, passing from concentrated production based on fossile sources to a decentralised one based on energy-saving and renewable sources. They are hence tools to be hopedfor, in particular in the transitional phase towards a degrowth society in which the costs of reconversion are widely diversified from enterprise to enterprise and from region to region.


3. From competition to cooperation: Fairness and criticism of development

Ceasing to be obsessed with growth and development is also the only way to face seriously the question of fairness. It has by now become apparent that the polarisation of wealth between north and south, and thus the tragedy of the poverty and emargination that involves at least half of the world’s population, are connected to the present model of development founded on competitive growth (Latouche, 1993, Rist, 1997). This process of growing polarisation is to be seen not only between the north and the south but also more generally, within a certain region, between the centre and the periphery (Amin, 2002), and, on a local level, between the town and the country. As we
have seen, this process of the polarisation of wealth is perfectly coherent, and comprehensible, within a systemic approach.
What is much less evident, in particular to leaders of the Left, who, however, have always shared this interpretation of development as being an unbalanced process, is the basic contradiction between the objectives announced in defence of welfare, of labour and of the environment and the states of growing competitiveness that characterise the economic system within the context of globalisation.
I shall illustrate this important passage with reference to one specific case, that of a lack of reduction in working hours.

3.1 A European pact for labour?

Greatly reducing working hours on a wide scale not only represents the way to free humanity from the spiral of commercialisation (Polanyi, 1974) and alienation but is also probably the only efficaceous policy, in  developed countries, for drastically reducing unemployment and precariousness. Having said this, as we know, the number of working hours has actually increased significantly in western countries over the last twenty years (far surpassing the limits recognised by trade unions), as an effect of the greater competitiveness required by the productive system within the context of globalisation. Some attempts have unsuccessfully been made to reduce the number of working hours, and the case in France is particularly renowned: those who first made a move in this direction have been forced to retrace their steps. Yet it is obvious why things happened in this way: since a reduction in working hours involves an increase in the unitary costs for enterprises, all other conditions being equal, anyone making the first move in a competitive system is at a disadvantage. In other words, the market will soon assume the task of making those countries that showed any particular ambitions in terms of a reduction in working hours  step into line , in the same way more generally as has happened to such ambitions as protecting rights and the environment,. This example shows very well why a true degrowth policy cannot be carried out in a competitive context. Agreements of international cooperation, for example on a European level, and policies in defence of the environment and of labour are unthinkable if separated from one another. This is a very important point. It explains, among other things, the systematic failures that policies in defence of welfare (and the environment) introduced by western governments have met with. Forced into the shallow waters of social liberalism, reformist policies in actual fact do not have at their disposal the economic margins for structural reforms, since every authentic reform entails significant costs that are automatically excluded by the imperative of international competitiveness. This is particularly true in a context such as that characterising countries with a fully developed capitalism system, where zero growth conditions are approached, and where, therefore, it is no longer possible to redistribute the significant increases in productivity that characterise the phases of Fordist capitalism to the benefit of labour.

In conclusion, without questioning the principle of competitiveness as a fundamental axis of the regulation of international economic relationships, and a move, however gradual, towards policies based on cooperation (for example, by means of formulating a  labour pact among countries in the European Union), it will not be possible to tackle efficient policies to fight unemployment and precariousness and, similarly, to protect the environment. It is clear how this different way of considering the relationships among human beings, and theirs with nature, based on cooperation, could offer a strong, precise sense to the accomplishment of a European political unity. Given the size of the internal market, on this scale it would be possible to do so. Shifting from competition to cooperation is hence the strategic axis in the successful pursuit of the aim of fairness. A politcal programme in this sense should further foresee, on a global level, a renunciation of traditional policies, based on power, in favour of new international relations, based on pacifism.


3.2 Degrowth and pacifism

Initiating a course towards a degrowth society probably represents the only way to face radically the problem of conflicts and wars, both old and new, that dog our times (Deriu, 2005). History teaches us that a civilisation based on expansion is incompatible with maintaining the peace. Degrowth, that is the (re-)organisation of the economic process according to self-sustainable, hence non-predatory, methods, in particular of those resources owned by other peoples or nations, is the indispensable premiss in order for war not be the only way of solving conflicts. However, besides a general  no to war , the present political crisis forces us to rethink far more radically, and question, the very idea of power and of the monopoly of the use of strength as the founding statute of politics, in favour of a logic based on non-violence and cooperation (Revelli, 2003). Although I intend to restrict myself here to an analysis of  what without going into the highly important questions of  how , I am fully convinced that the transition towards a new economy and a new society depends on the new methods politicians can adopt before the contents are even faced. They cannot but think very critically and question their privileges and narcissism, starting with the forms of politcal actions, (Ginsborg, 2006), which calls, among other things, for an extensive participation of those in the lower strata, particularly of women.

3.3 Valorization of territories, common goods and solidarity economics

On a local level, a degrowth policy could be applied by starting with:

· Self-sustaining valorization of territories (defence of common goods)
· Extending the networks of solidarity economics

The first point is basically expressed in the rediscovery of the  place statutes , that is to say in the upkeep and valorization of systems of ecology, society and know-how found in a certain territory (Magnaghi, 2000). It is no surprise to discover that these systems comprise the so-called  common wealth (water, air, territory, biodiversity, shared knowledge, etc.) in defence of which, as is known, local communities everywhere have become mobilised, in particular in countries in the south of the world (Shiva, 2003). In the conflicts concerning water, in particular, a series of significant experiences are coagulating, where we can find some clues for a true  new story of what we mean by a degrowth society (Petrella, 2007). 

However, which forms of economy may favour the establishment in territories of a fairer economy? The idea proposed here traverses the creation of economic realities founded on the principle of reciprocity. This is the course that we might define as solidarity economics (Laville, 1998). As is known, this universe contains a great variety of experiences and forms of exchange that go from neoclan relationships, typical of extended African families (which, therefore, do not foresee any exchange of money) to enterprises of the so-called  third sector (social cooperation, fair trade, ethical finance), passing through multifarious  hybrid forms, such as those characteristic of systems of local exchange (where a market does exist but is limited by rather restrictive ethical principles and by nearby exchanges). In any case, all these forms of exchange, in subtracting increasing amounts of demand from international markets in favour of the local economy, represent both a source of degrowth and a workshop for another economy and another society. For this world to have the strength to sustain itself and sow the seeds of other similar experiences, it is important to be aware of the limitations that characterise the traditional strategy of the  third sector . In order to avoid the very concrete risk that it will end up by being absorbed in the commercialising logic of the capitalist market, it is fundamental to adopt a  network strategy that makes it possible to maintain the resources produced according to  sustainable solidarity criteria within the network itself. It is this characteristic, whose potential has not yet been fully understood or studied, that distinguishes the networks of solidarity economics (NSE), making them a promising workshop for degrowth.


4. From dependence to autonomy

"The customer is always right" says a worn-out, familiar defence of orthodox economics. Homo consumens today undoubtedly has an unbelievable freedom of choice at his disposal: it has been calculated that in the city of New York alone 10 billion different types of objects are available. However, as Bauman has pointed out (2005, 2007), the citizen-consumer can make his choices only within a predefined set; he cannot determine ex ante the range of objects from which he may choose. Technology certainly belongs to this set. In other words, the market system promises freedom but conditions dependence. On the plane of the collective imaginary, the liquidity that characterises the postmodern condition is expressed in an extreme fragmentation of the values and visions of the world. The dissolution of the grand narratives makes it impossible for a person to grasp the full meaning of his own deeds and to perceive the global web of relationships in which he finds himself. This inability to comprehend the structural reasons that lie at the root, among other things, of the loss of one s own quality of life further fuels dependence. Imagining an autonomous society, therefore, requires a way out of this spiral, a profound transformation of values and culture that is capable of effecting a transformation of the dominant institutions. 

To create one s own laws, self-determination and explicit self-institution: this is the basic significance of what we mean by autonomy. As one may easily intuit, it is a dimension of fundamental importance within the new project for society. It involves questions of major import, about which debate and confrontation, even within movements, are in their early stages. There is the widely shared conviction, however, that, whatever the government rules that the new project for society chooses may be, they must come from the lower strata, from communities and territories. They must pursue forms of direct, substantial democracy, leaving citizens, not representatives or experts, the chance to define, among other things, the economic and social conditions of the production of wealth. It is on this level, which we may define as the community, that the new political organisations, who will be the bearers of the new project for society, will have to seek as their priority consensus (Fotopulos, 1997). The new Winter Palace is, therefore, above all the town hall. Later, it is to be hoped that the relationships among the various communities may be extended in the form of a  confederation of communities (Bookchin, 1993). If this statement is to be of any use in orientating political priorities and avoiding old mistakes, however, it must be equally clear that the true Winter Palace stands above all within every one of us. In other words, as Castoriadis has acutely shown, the problem of autonomy concerns first and foremost the self. The priority, hence, is to pay close attention to the essential exercise of selfeducation, of awareness, of becoming consciousness of unconscious conditioning, which constitutes the inevitable premises for an autonomous society to establish itself. In the initial phase it will thus be important to rethink the cultural, educational and informative system aiming at:


· Educational methods that tend to favour: awareness, autonomy, critical sense, creative leisure time, well-being as opposed to well-having;
· Reform of the media;
· Educational policies having the purpose of changing styles of life and consumption.

The educational system throughout the modern age has been moulded to produce docile consumers and reliable technicians. From this perspective, schools basically had the task of transferring instrumental notions to the tasks required of future operators in the technical system (Illich, 1974). This specialist and instrumental concept of instruction has already entered a crisis. In a society of risk and uncertainty, the more rigid and instrumental our knowledge is, the more our subjective risk and dependence in the face of the system increases. The role of education, in a degrowth civilisation, should thus be to overthrow this model completely. It should rather provide a framework of the systemic relations that enable a person to orientate himself consciously, to learn how to learn and, thus, when faced with unforeseen situations, to develop the capacity to seek, even collectively, the best solutions for adaptation. It is pointless to say that today s system of information, particularly through the media, carries out a very efficient action in the opposite direction. A profound reform of the media system, which has no scruples about imposing limitations, among other things, to the invasion of commercials, is needed. It is certainly the case to propose new values, alternative to the dominant ones: autonomy instead of dependence, a sense of control instead of arrogance, reciprocity instead of egoism, wellbeing and frugality instead of well-having, etc. However, it must be made clear that that it is not possible to hope for a vast, widespread transformation of values without modifying the social conditions of the production of wealth. In other words, the relationship between values and institutions is of a systemic nature. The affirmation of strong, autonomous personalities is possible only within a social and institutional context that will educate individuals towards their own selfdetermination, since personality itself, and needless to say the capacity for political action, is formed in the profound interaction between the individual and the community (Bookchin, 2003). Finally, it is undoubtedly necessary to encourage policies that are aimed at changing styles of life and consumption. This today is an aspect that is strongly felt within political movements and forms of association among ordinary citizens (purchasing with a critical eye, producing for oneself, fair trade, etc). These practices are undoubtedly worthwhile, particularly as an exercise in transforming the self (and hence the imaginary). In some cases they reveal the concrete possibility of carrying out (some) alternative economic practices. Yet it would be illusory to believe that the action on the part of individuals, or small groups, alone would enable people to transform the severe laws that govern the capitalist economy. It calls for us to be well aware of the centrality of the political dimensions of change along with the importance of acting properly. The least we can hope for is that the tragic failures recorded on both sides, on the part of those who wanted to make these approaches absolutes, may help to comprehend how, in a systemic perspective, the eternal question of whether change must concern first the economic structures, or first the individual and his values, merely serves to delay change. It is obvious that both changes are necessary and that each accompanies and sustains the transformation of the other.


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1 The issues examined in this paper were discussed by the members of the “Italian Degrowth Network”. A first draft
of this paper was presented at the conference “Degrowth and Politics” in Rome, October 2007 and then in Paris,
April 2008.
2 E-mail to: Questo indirizzo e-mail è protetto dallo spam bot. Abilita Javascript per vederlo.
3 The difference in incomes between the 20% richest and the 20% poorest increased from a ratio of 30:1 in 1960 to 74:1 in 1997. Cf. UNDP, Human Development Report, Oxford University Press, 1999.